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ESSAY
DEMYTHOLOGIZING PROPERTY AND THE
ILLUSION OF RULES: A RESPONSE TO TWO
FRIENDLY CRITICS
Gregory S. Alexandert
Academic life can be a depressing experience. Despite the enor-
mous amount of time many academics spend producing written schol-
arship, most of us have little expectation that more than a tiny
handful of people will read our published work, if indeed it is read at
all. And probably even fewer of us have any expectation whatsoever
that the results of our often wrenching labor will be publicly aired. It
is a rare occasion when an academic's scholarship is the subject of
public recognition. But oh, how we crave any sort of public commen-
tary, favorable or critical! So, I am extremely grateful that Dean Da-
gan and Professor Underkuffler found my book, The Global Debate over
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence, worthy
of public critique. I am deeply grateful to them for participating in
this discussion and also to the Editors of the Cornell Law Review for
devoting the space in these pages to make this public conversation
possible. In this brief Essay, I will confine my comments to what seem
to me to be Dean Dagan's and Professor Underkuffler's main points.
I
DEMYTHOLOGIZING PROPERTY: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR UNDERKUFFLER
Professor Underkuffler primarily focuses on my notion of the so-
cial-obligation norm in constitutional property law.' She begins dis-
cussing the need for such a norm by describing a mythology that
besets property. 2 Property, she suggests, is typically imagined and dis-
cussed, both in popular and legal consciousness, in terms of separa-
tion, isolation, individual autonomy, and self-control. 3 Within this
t A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am deeply grateful to my
colleague Eduardo Pefialver for his comments on this Essay as well his remarks at the
colloquium on my book at Cornell Law School.
1 See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property as Constitutional Myth: Utilities and Dangers, 92
CORNELL L. Riv. 1239, 1242 (2007) (essay).
2 See id. at 1234-44.
3 See id. at 1244.
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discourse, property is one-sided and nearly absolute, defined from the
individual owner's perspective alone. 4 This way of understanding
property rights is a mythology, she contends, because property is un-
avoidably social. 5 Property is not and logically cannot be purely indi-
vidual; it always affects someone else. 6
Underkuffler notes that this dissonance between discourse and
reality is true of all individual rights, but she contends that the mythol-
ogy of property is particularly engrained in popular consciousness. 7
Although political rhetoric and popular culture tend to define and
discuss all individual rights solely from the rights-bearer's perspective,
most people intuitively understand that rights such as free speech are
social, contextual, and contingent.8 They recognize that these rights
are relational and that the myth that such rights are purely individual
and acontextual is just that: a myth.9 This is not so with respect to
property rights, according to Underkuffler. She believes that people
generally conceive of property as individual and isolational rather
than social.' 0 One indication of this, she suggests, is that inquiries
concerning the justice of takings law are one-sided, focused solely on
what the owner has lost rather than what others have gained.1"
As Professor Underkuffler notes, this situation is ironic-and, I
would add, somewhat paradoxical-because the mythology of rights
as nonrelational and one-sided is actually less true of property than it
is of other rights. 12 People can conceive of freedoms such as the right
to free speech in such terms because they are freedoms that, as she
puts it, "individuals can naturally, individually, and equally enjoy."' 3 In
contrast, private property rights permit individuals who control re-
sources subject to these rights to exclude others in such a way that the
excluded parties cannot simultaneously enjoy these resources. 14 This
is, of course, the familiar allocative function of property rights. 15 Pre-
cisely because of this allocative function, it is impossible to define
4 See id.
5 See id. at 1244-45, 1247-48.
6 See id. This, I take it, is the point of the arresting sentence in what is perhaps the
single most influential essay on the literature on the economics of property rights: "In the
world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role." Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Proerty Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 347 (1967).
7 See Underkuffler, supra note 1, at 1244-45.
8 See id. at 1244.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 1244-45.
11 See id. at 1246-47.
12 See id. at 1247.
13 Id. (emphasis added).
14 See id.
15 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LES-
SONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 5 (2006).
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property rights in strictly private terms. There are always losers along
with winners.
I would refine Professor Underkuffler's point only slightly. As I
pointed out in my book, individual rights other than private property
may also have allocative effects. 16 But the difference between rights to
property and rights to speech, for example, is that the allocation of
scarce resources is not understood to be a function, let alone a core
function, of speech. The allocation of scarce resources is, however, a
core function for property rights. 17 Indeed, the inherently allocative
aspect of property rights is a major reason why there has been so
much debate about private property rights.' 8
Professor Underkuffler acknowledges that this mythology of
property can perform useful functions, but argues that the benefits of
this mythology have dwindled in modern American society, where re-
ality is becoming more obvious. 19 In agreeing with me that it is now
necessary to explicitly develop a social-obligation norm in American
takings law, she states, "We no longer have the luxury of operating
with the 'mythology' of property as a free-standing, individually pro-
tective, socially acontextual entity."20 The regulatory revolution in
land-use law has exposed the dissonance between the myth and the
reality of property rights, leading property-rights advocates to organ-
ize popular political campaigns to roll back all manner of land-use
regulations.2 1 Fueling this backlash, Professor Underkuffler con-
tends, is the mythology of property.22 The problem is not just that
legislatures are eliminating beneficial land-use measures, but that the
whole debate lacks "acknowledgment of property's necessary and una-
voidable contextuality."23
Although the absence of any explicit social-obligation norm in
American takings law is not the only factor that has contributed to this
mythology of property and to the mythology's impact on the debate
over land-use regulation, it is one important contributing factor. It is
not that such a norm is entirely absent-a social-obligation norm does
exist in American property law. Traces of it are scattered around both
constitutional and private-law doctrines.24 However, murky notions
such as the Takings Clause's "noxious use" doctrine obscure the so-
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Underkuffler, supra note 1, at 1248-49.
20 Id. at 1243.
21 See id. at 1250-51.
22 See id. at 1250.
23 Id. at 1252.
24 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 227-33.
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cial-obligation norm. 25 The core premise of the noxious use doctrine,
though, is that private owners have a duty to protect and promote
society's well-being.2 6 The doctrine implicitly acknowledges that, as
Professor Underkuffler has elsewhere put it, "[p] roperty rights are, by
nature, social rights." 27 Frank Michelman has also identified some-
thing similar to what I call the social-obligation norm in American
constitutional law.28 His account of our constitutional commitment to
property as a tool for the common good is worth quoting fully. He
states:
Our constitutional culture includes a deep and ancient tradi-
tion of expected regard, when you make use of your property, for
other people's and the public's interest and concerns. It includes a
deep and ancient strain that says this expectation of regard for pub-
lic interest and concerns is subject, when the occasion requires, to
legislative definition and regulatory enforcement, a strain that de-
veloped early under the rubric of public nuisance. The tradition, in
sum, is one of a law of property that is functionally oriented to contempo-
ray community goals, as well as to protection of private advantage, and
that relies on the police powers of legislatures, alongside common
law adjudication by courts, to negotiate and mediate between the
two.
2 9
It is one thing, however, for the social-obligation norm to exist
implicitly in legal doctrines; it is another thing to overtly acknowledge
and develop it. This is what has been lacking in American law, espe-
cially takings law. Although takings law does implicitly acknowledge a
social-obligation norm, courts have not systemically developed that
norm.
Making the social-obligation norm explicit is important for both
expressive and substantive reasons. The Takings Clause expresses
multiple social meanings that go beyond the fairness and efficiency
rationales that courts and commentators typically acknowledge. The
Takings Clause's normatively pluralistic character reflects the norma-
tively pluralistic character of American property law generally. Like
the private law of property, the Takings Clause, as Dean Dagan has
elsewhere commented, "is devoted to realizing not only the common
good of individual liberty but also other common goods: social re-
sponsibility and equality."30
25 See id. at 76-77.
26 See id.
27 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 145
(2003).
28 See Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FOROHAM
ENvrL. L. REv. 409, 416 (1995).
29 Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
30 Hanoch Dagan, Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MIcH. L. REv.
134, 149 (2000).
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Takings discourse needs to articulate openly these multiple
meanings, especially social responsibility. An open recognition and
systematic development of the social-obligation dimension of owner-
ship would confront the mythology of property that is distorting our
public debate over the propriety of various land-use regulations. My-
thologies die hard, but they are not immune from attempts to pry
open their basic assumptions. This is the point at which a compara-
tive approach can make its greatest contribution. It throws into ques-
tion those taken-for-granted assumptions of the legal system and the
society that it serves. As Professor Underkuffler observes, my discus-
sion of the work of social-obligation norms in the German and South
African constitutions illustrates that the security of property rights
does not depend on the existence of the mythology of property as
nonrelational.31 Open recognition of the social obligation, as she
puts it, "need not push us down some slippery slope in which all sense
of the human need for property is lost. ' 32
II
THE SocLAL-REsPONSIBILrrY NoRM AND THE ILLUSION OF
RuLES: A REPLY TO DEAN DAGAN
Dean Dagan's self-described "friendly critique" is indeed
friendly.33 What unites us far outweighs what divides us. We disagree
primarily over means, not ends. Both of us are committed to the pro-
ject of recognizing and normatively developing the social dimension
of property in both private and constitutional law. Even our differ-
ences over means are relatively modest. Still, it is worth discussing at
least those differences that seem most significant.
A. Ends
Dean Dagan states that the purpose of the social-obligation norm
is justice. 34 Of course it is about justice. But the real question is what
conception of justice should ground the duties that property owners
owe to society. It is precisely because there are many competing theo-
ries ofjustice that the scope and consequences of the social-obligation
norm are inherently, and strongly, controversial. Dean Dagan's con-
ception of justice appears to be a straightforwardly liberal conception
of distributive justice.35 But there are other objectives a social-obliga-
tion norm could serve, including community. Dean Dagan's concep-
31 See Underkuffler, supra note 1, at 1240-43, 1253.
32 See id. at 1253.
33 Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1256
(2007) (essay).
34 See id. at 1259.
35 See id.
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tion of community seems to be one in which a community can only
demand concessions from its members if it is likely to pay back those
debts in the long, if not the short, run.36 That is, membership in a
community, political or otherwise, never warrants sacrifices by its
members that are highly unlikely to remain uncompensated. 37 A full
response to this claim would require a much more lengthy and funda-
mental treatment than I can give in this brief reply. I do want to note,
however, that there remains something about this conception that
strikes me as incomplete. The theory that long-term as well as short-
term or immediate compensation needs to be taken into account in
determining whether compensation is due seems to me correct,
within limits. There is genuine reason for concern that the social-
obligation norm might be carried too far and oppress the poor and
politically weak. Dean Dagan's theory of long-term reciprocity serves
as a useful way to identify and isolate such cases of exploitation.38
But I suspect that my conception of community is more robust
and, in that sense, more demanding than Dean Dagan's. This concep-
tion of community, which I have defended elsewhere, 39 holds that be-
ing a member of a community means that sometimes we may have to
make sacrifices even though, individually, we may not plausibly re-
ceive compensation, even over the long term, that remotely approxi-
mates the sacrifices we made. An obvious example is military
conscription. Without necessarily committing myself to advocating
restoration of the draft, I simply want to point out that one possible
basis for justifying compulsory military service is the notion that mem-
bership in a political community may entail noncompensable sacri-
fices for the good of the entire community, as well as enjoyment of the
fruits of community membership. Of course, there is a legitimate con-
cern that this conception of community may be taken too far. We
need to protect important values like fairness, self-realization, and
human dignity, even as we recognize that community membership im-
poses duties. This is the irreducible tension that runs throughout tak-
ings law and at least partly explains why takings law is unavoidably
muddled. 40 But if we limit recognition of our contributory obligations
strictly to circumstances where the individual eventually gets a benefit
as valuable as the burden she has sustained, then we weaken our con-
36 See id. at 1266-67.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989).
40 See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 259, 260-61 (1992); Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the
Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 599, 599, 604 (1991);
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
561, 588-97 (1984).
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ception of community and hinder it from fostering human flourish-
ing. Making the community's return contribution to the individual
the sole touchstone for whether and when individuals owe obligations
to the community ends up implicitly operating on the same quid-pro-
quo logic in which the community's legitimacy depends on its serving
the well-being of the ontologically prior individual, rather than, in
some sense, constituting the individual. 41
B. Means
Dean Dagan's most significant points, in my mind, involve the
means by which the social-obligation norm is realized. He criticizes
several aspects of German constitutional property law as problematic
for various reasons, 42 and I want to join issue with him on some of
these.
As a preliminary matter, a clarification is in order. Regarding the
role of dependence in setting the strength of the social-obligation
norm, German law does not view the dependence of nonowners on
the use of another's property in the abstract.43 Dependence is not an
isolated factor; it is inextricably bound up with the overall relational
calculus. Thus, Dean Dagan's suggestion that courts should "focus[ ]
on the nature of the relationship between the dependent party and
the owner whose property is diminished in value" 44 is precisely the
approach to setting the social-responsibility level that German law
adopts. This point was inadequately clarified in my book.
The most intriguing suggestion in Dean Dagan's critique con-
cerns the possibility of awarding partial compensation. 45 Here again,
our differences are less significant than our agreements. Both of us
agree that partial compensation is "a more nuanced takings doctrine
than the one currently available." 46 Our basic disagreement concerns
the use of rules rather than a more open-ended standard as the guid-
ing norm for determining when and how much partial compensation
courts should award. Dean Dagan argues that my "endorsement of ad
hoc application of constitutional commitments and ex post adjust-
ment of property rights is unjustifiable [and] . . . . unnecessary to
41 An older but still rich exposition of this approach to community is Jacques Mari-
tain, The Person and the Common Good, 8 REv. POL. 419, 449-50 (1946). I am indebted to
Eduardo Pefialver for bringing this essay to my attention.
42 See Dagan, supra note 33, at 1265-67.
43 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 135-36 (discussing the German courts' analysis of
dependence in the context of other factors and illustrating these contextual factors with
the example of the Small Garden Plot Case).
44 Dagan, supra note 33, at 1266.
45 See id. at 1267-69.
46 Id. at 1268.
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achieve [our] goals." 47 Here, we simply disagree. Without rehearsing
the all-too-familiar arguments in the rules-vs.-standards debate, 48 I do
need to make two points about the question of means. First, I did.not
mean to advocate the unrelenting use of open-ended and vague stan-
dards. Rather, my suggested approach is better described as 'judicial
practical reasoning."49
The second point concerns Dean Dagan's important, indeed,
central, emphasis on equality. He argues that "[r]ule-based regimes
promote equality by reducing the (sometimes unconscious) possibility
of a bias in the application of officials' discretion."50 It is not clear to
me that in the abstract, rules promote equality better than a more
discretionary regime. My sense is that this can only be determined
contextually. Much depends on what substantive issue is at stake, what
institution is involved, and how well-known the rule is among the pool
of persons who are subject to it. There are good reasons to be skepti-
cal about the equality-promoting benefits of rules. For example, the
lay public (and even some lawyers) may not know the legal rules, espe-
cially those that are highly technical in character. Even if known,
moreover, technical rules often require legal assistance in order to
honor them in practice. The rules prescribing formalities for execu-
tion of wills, for example, traditionally have been hard-edged, but
there is good reason to believe that they hurt the poor far more than
they do the wealthy.51 It is easy for the lay person to get tripped up by
them, making it strongly advisable for people to have lawyers prepare
their wills. 52 Indeed, one of the main reasons why the trend in wills
law is against hard-and-fast rules53 is precisely because they tend to
disadvantage the poor. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is
perhaps an even more obvious example of a "crystal"-like rule 54 whose
compliance as a practical matter requires legal counsel-usually high-
47 Id.
48 For compelling arguments on this issue see id. at 114 n.88 (listing sources);
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 136-39 (1997); and Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
49 See Frank Michelman, A Reply to Susan Rose-Ackerman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1712, 1712
(1988).
50 Dagan, supra note 33, at 1268.
51 See, e.g., James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L.
REv. 541, 545 (1990).
52 Cf Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 1033, 1036-37 (1994) (noting easily overlooked formal defects, none of which
would necessarily be obvious to a layperson, that might cause a court to invalidate a will).
53 See generally id. (exploring the tension regarding the "role of formalism in private
law adjudication" and critiques of formalism in wills adjudication).
54 Carol Rose first coined the term "crystal" as applied to rules. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988).
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priced legal counsel at that.55 Such rules are traps for the unwary or
unsophisticated and frustrate rather than advance the goal of equality.
A second problem with rules from the perspective of equality is
that they can be set up to favor a particular set of class interests, pre-
cisely the problem that worries Dean Dagan. 56 An obvious example is
Professor Richard Epstein's approach to takings questions. 57 Ep-
stein's theory of takings is quite clear and rule-like, but it is hardly
likely to promote equality. Its effect would be simply to lock in the
existing distribution of wealth, thereby advantaging the haves over the
have-nots.
A third problem with Dean Dagan's proposal is that the "rule-
ness" of his rules is somewhat illusory. For example, the proposal
would have courts apply differential levels of compensation according
to the type of benefited community. 58 Differential percentages of
compensation are set depending upon whether the beneficiary of the
expropriation or (in the case of a regulatory taking) a land-use regula-
tion is a "local" or a "larger" community.59 But the distinction be-
tween local and broader communities is not self-defining. The
relevant local community of an affected landowner will vary depend-
ing on the identity and size of the landowner. My local community is
not the same as Del Webb's 60 or any other large publicly traded devel-
oper. Del Webb's relevant community is not confined to one city or
even one state, as mine is.61 The difference in our respective commu-
nities affects the calculus of reciprocity. Dean Dagan's notion is that
long-term reciprocity is greater (requiring a lower level of compensa-
tion) when a local community is the actor than when a large commu-
nity is the actor creating the harm.62 But because Del Webb operates
on a vastly different, i.e., larger, scale than I do, our relevant commu-
nities are different, and what harmful actions we, as landowners, can
justifiably tolerate-our reciprocity bases-will differ substantially.
Operating within the terms of Dean Dagan's analysis, one might argue
that harmful actions by the state or even the federal government
55 Cf Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1987) (noting that even many lawyers do not under-
stand the Rule Against Perpetuities well enough to be certain they are creating valid
interests).
56 See Dagan, supra note 33, at 1268-69.
57 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMi-
NENT DOMAIN (1985).
58 See Dagan, supra note 33, at 1269-72.
59 See id. at 1270.
60 Del Webb Corp. is a national development corporation that specializes in building
communities throughout the United States for families and active adults age 55 and over.
For more information, see Del Webb Corp., Active Adult Communities, www.delwebb.com
(last visited June 27, 2007).
61 See id.
62 See Dagan, supra note 33, at 1269-72.
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against me may require compensation because the degree of long-
term reciprocity is slight, but precisely because of its larger scale, Del
Webb is much more likely to be able to tolerate the same action with
no payment of compensation.
The shifting meanings of local and nonlocal communities as the
scale of the affected owner changes complicates the other element in
Dean Dagan's grid of rules, the distinction between property that is
"fungible" and that which is "constitutive."6 3 As an owner's local com-
munity changes, so will the identity of its property as constitutive or
fungible. Property that was constitutive of Hewlett-Packard when Wil-
liam Hewlett and David Packard were tinkering in a garage in Palo
Alto is today fungible. These complications undermine both the pre-
dictability and equality benefits of Dean Dagan's grid.
Despite these differences, Dean Dagan, Professor Underkuffler,
and I are in basic agreement on fundamental points regarding the
inherent existence of a social obligation in ownership and on the
need for scholars and courts to explicitly acknowledge and develop
the social-obligation norm, especially in takings law. Comparative law
is certainly not the only source that might usefully guide such an en-
deavor, but it is a very good place to start.
6 3 See id. at 1270-72.
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